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H O N O R A B L E

M E N T I O N

Prosecutorial Discretion and
Environmental Crime
by David M. Uhlmann
David M. Uhlmann is the Jeffrey F. Liss Professor from Practice and Director of the
Environmental Law and Policy Program, University of Michigan Law School.

T

he environmental laws create a complex regulatory
system affecting a wide range of economic activity
in the United States. The Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act (RCRA) establishes a cradle-to-grave
regulatory scheme for hazardous wastes; the Clean Water
Act (CWA) regulates all discharges of pollutants into
waters of the United States; and the Clean Air Act (CAA)
imposes limits on all air pollutants that could endanger
public health and welfare. As with any complex regulatory
scheme, there are significant disparities in the seriousness of environmental violations. Some involve devastating pollution, evacuation of communities, or deliberate
efforts to mislead regulators. Others may be de minimis
violations or isolated events that occur notwithstanding a
robust compliance program.
Given the wide range of potential environmental violations, it might have been preferable for Congress to
specify which environmental violations could result in
criminal prosecution. Instead, Congress made only limited distinctions between acts that could result in criminal, civil, or administrative enforcement. Even the most
technical violation of the environmental laws theoretically
could result in criminal prosecution if the defendant acted
with the mental state specified by the statute. Mental state
is not required for civil or administrative violations, but
the additional proof required for criminal prosecution
often does little to differentiate between criminal, civil,
and administrative violations. In most cases, the government must show only that the defendant acted knowingly.
In other words, the government must show defendants
know they are engaging in the conduct that is a violation
of the law; the government is not required to show that
defendants know they are breaking the environmental
laws. Indeed, in some cases, the government is required to
prove only that the defendant acted negligently; in other
The full version of this Article was originally published as: David
M. Uhlmann, Prosecutorial Discretion and Environmental Crime,
38 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 159 (2014). It has been excerpted with
permission of Harvard Environmental Law Review and David
M. Uhlmann. Please see the full article for footnotes and sources.
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cases, the government is not required to show any mental
state at all.
If the same violation often could give rise to criminal,
civil, or administrative enforcement—and if mental state
requirements only preclude criminal enforcement for a
small subset of violations—what determines which environmental violations result in criminal prosecution? The
answer is the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, which
exists in all areas of the criminal law, but assumes a particularly critical role in environmental cases because so
much conduct falls within the criminal provisions of the
environmental laws. Critics of environmental criminal
enforcement argue that Congress gave too much discretion to prosecutors or, even worse from their perspective,
to EPA enforcement officials. They note that whether a
case is prosecuted criminally may be determined by nothing more substantive than whether the case originates
with a criminal investigator or with one of their civil or
administrative counterparts within the agency. Even supporters of criminal enforcement acknowledge that prosecutorial discretion is broad under the environmental laws.
But they insist that it is no greater than in other areas of
economic or regulatory crime and that Congress properly
relied on the good sense of prosecutors, the wisdom of
judges, and the judgment of juries to determine when violators of the environmental laws should be convicted of
criminal activity.
I see no merit in debating whether prosecutorial discretion is broad under the environmental laws—it clearly
is—and I concede that it may be disquieting in a nation
predicated on the rule of law that we depend so much
on individual prosecutors to determine what conduct
should be criminally prosecuted. I also acknowledge that
the extent of prosecutorial discretion under the environmental laws may raise uncertainty in the regulated community about which environmental violations will result
in criminal prosecution. On the other hand, our criminal
justice system always relies to some degree upon the exercise of prosecutorial discretion to determine which violations will be prosecuted criminally. To evaluate whether
prosecutors have too much discretion—and to address

NEWS & ANALYSIS

45 ELR 10801

Copyright © 2015 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.

45 ELR 10802

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORTER

claims that the environmental laws criminalize too much
conduct—we need to know more about the circumstances
under which environmental prosecutors exercise their discretion to seek criminal charges for violations.
For environmental crimes, I have written that prosecutors should exercise their discretion to reserve criminal
enforcement for cases with one or more of the following
aggravating factors: (1) significant environmental harm or
public health effects; (2) deceptive or misleading conduct;
(3) operating outside the regulatory system; or (4) repetitive violations.1 Limiting criminal enforcement to cases
with one or more of these aggravating factors would preclude prosecution for technical or de minimis violations
and provide greater clarity about which environmental
violations might result in criminal charges. The presence
of one or more of these factors also would delineate an
appropriate role for criminal prosecution in the environmental regulatory scheme by limiting criminal prosecution
to cases involving substantial harm or risk of harm or to
cases in which the conduct involves the type of deliberate
misconduct we consider criminal in other contexts as well.
My views about prosecutorial discretion for environmental crime draw on my experience serving for seventeen years as a federal environmental crimes prosecutor,
including seven as Chief of the Environmental Crimes
Section when I was responsible for approving all charging decisions in cases brought by my office. The factors
track what EPA has identified as significant in its exercise
of investigative discretion and draw from the Principles
of Federal Prosecution that govern all criminal cases
brought by the Justice Department. But my former office
does not handle all cases prosecuted under the federal
environmental laws—the remainder are prosecuted by
United States Attorneys—and the office does not require
the presence of any specific aggravating factors to justify
criminal charges. As a result, in my prior scholarship, I
could not show the extent to which my normative model
is descriptive as well.
I therefore created the Environmental Crimes Project
to analyze the extent to which the aggravating factors
I have identified as normatively desirable were present
in recent prosecutions. Over a three-year period, with
research assistance from 120 students at the University of
Michigan Law School, we reviewed all cases investigated
by EPA from 2005–2010. To ensure a representative data
set, we focused on defendants charged in federal court
with pollution crime or related Title 18 offenses. We conducted our review based on court documents for over
600 cases involving nearly 900 defendants. In addition to
analyzing the aggravating factors, we also compiled data
regarding the types of defendants charged, the judicial
districts and EPA regions involved, the statutes charged,
and the outcomes of the cases. In the process, we developed a comprehensive database of information about pol1.	

See David M. Uhlmann, Environmental Crime Comes of Age: The Evolution
of Criminal Enforcement in the Environmental Regulatory Scheme, 4 Utah L.
Rev. 1223, 1246-52 (2009).
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lution cases investigated by EPA from 2005–2010 that
resulted in federal criminal charges.
Based on our research, I have determined that one or
more aggravating factors were present in 96% of environmental criminal prosecutions from 2005–2010. This
finding supports at least two significant conclusions.
First, in exercising their discretion to bring criminal
charges, prosecutors almost always focus on violations
that include one or more of the aggravating factors I have
identified. Second, violations that do not include one of
those aggravating factors are not likely to be prosecuted
criminally. I cannot say whether these aggravating factors
will trigger criminal prosecution; declined cases are not
public, so we do not have a control group of cases where
prosecutors decided not to pursue criminal charges. Nor
could we create a comparison group of civil matters,
because civil cases involve notice pleading and most are
resolved by consent decrees that do not identify whether
there were aggravating factors. Indeed, I would expect
that civil and administrative cases also involve at least
significant harm and repetitive violations (deceptive or
misleading conduct, in my experience, is likely to result
in a referral for criminal enforcement). Nonetheless, my
finding that criminal enforcement is reserved for cases
involving at least one of the aggravating factors I have
identified should provide greater clarity about the role of
environmental criminal enforcement and reduce uncertainty in the regulated community about which environmental violations might lead to criminal charges.
This excerpted version of my article has two Parts. Part
I focuses on the presence or absence of the individual
aggravating factors in each case. Part II analyzes how
often multiple aggravating factors are present and assesses
defendants with no aggravating factors. Based on the
empirical evidence presented here, I conclude that criminal enforcement has been reserved for violations with the
aggravating factors I have identified, which suggests that
prosecutors have exercised their discretion in ways that
should ameliorate concerns about over-criminalization.

I.

The Presence of Individual Aggravating
Factors in Environmental Criminal
Prosecutions

In this Part, I provide the results of our efforts to determine whether the individual aggravating factors I have
identified were present in pollution prosecutions initiated
from 2005–2010. We determined that 96% of the defendants (828 out of 864 defendants) engaged in conduct
involving at least one of the four aggravating factors. The
most prevalent aggravating factors were repetitive violations (78% or 679 defendants) and deceptive or misleading conduct (63% or 545 defendants). The third most
common factor was operating outside the regulatory
scheme (33% or 287 defendants), followed by defendants
who caused significant harm (17% or 144 defendants).
These findings are shown in Figure 1 below:

Copyright © 2015 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.
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Figure 1. Prosecutorial Discretion Factors
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These results support two significant conclusions, both
of which suggest that criminal enforcement was reserved
for culpable conduct under the environmental laws from
2005–2010.
First, one or more aggravating factors are present for nearly
all defendants prosecuted under the environmental laws.
This is a significant finding in light of over-criminalization claims, since it suggests that criminal enforcement is
reserved for conduct involving the aggravating factors that,
under my normative model, might warrant criminal prosecution. It also may help address randomness claims about
criminal enforcement, since it suggests that prosecutorial
discretion may follow a distinctive pattern by focusing on
defendants who engage in conduct involving one or more
aggravating factors.
Second, it is unlikely that there will be a criminal prosecution if no aggravating factor is present. We identified only a
small number of defendants (36) who engaged in conduct
that did not involve one of the aggravating factors. This
finding suggests that prosecutors are unlikely to pursue
criminal charges for violations of the environmental laws
that do not involve significant harm, deceptive or misleading conduct, facilities operating outside the regulatory
system, or repetitive violations. It also may help mitigate
concerns that prosecutors are targeting technical violations
and defendants who acted in good faith.
In the Sections that follow, I present data and analysis
regarding each of the aggravating factors.2
2.	

We obtained the same results when we analyzed at the case level: nearly
96% of all cases (635 out of 664 cases) involved at least one of the aggravating factors. We also achieved nearly identical results when we analyzed the
individual aggravating factors at the case level: 17% for significant harm;
59% for deceptive or misleading conduct; 33% for operating outside the

45 ELR 10803

A. Significant Environmental Harm/Public
Health Effects

Cases involving significant environmental
harm and public health effects often receive
attention from investigators and prosecutors.
EPA emphasizes environmental harm and
public health effects in its memorandum to
investigators regarding the proper exercise of
investigative discretion. Prosecutors also focus
on these cases for a practical reason—they
679
are more compelling for judges and juries. In
white collar cases generally and environmental cases in particular, prosecutors worry that
jury nullification may occur if they prove only
the elements of the charged offenses without
providing juries with a narrative that allows
them to view the conduct as morally culpable.
Repetitive
Our study focused on five types of harm:
Violations
(1) serious bodily injury or death; (2) knowing or negligent endangerment; (3) animal
deaths; (4) cleanup costs; and (5) evacuations
and emergency responses. At least one of these
factors was present for 15% of the defendants
in our study (131 of the 864 defendants). Significant environmental harm that did not fit into one of the five factors
listed above was present for an additional 13 defendants.
Overall, 17% of the defendants included in our study (144
of the 864 defendants) were charged with conduct involving significant environmental harm, a statistically significant percentage but the smallest of the four aggravating
factors analyzed.
While our data suggest that significant harm was caused
by only one-sixth of the criminal defendants, it merits
emphasis that we focused on conduct where harm appeared
to be a distinctive “plus” factor in criminal cases. Most pollution crime involves risk of environmental harm or public
health effects, since those factors are present whenever pollutants and hazardous wastes are improperly stored, disposed, discharged, or released into the environment. If we
had included all potential contamination cases—for example, every CWA discharge case, every RCRA storage and
disposal case, and all of the CAA asbestos cases—the harm
numbers would have been much higher, involving 73% of
all cases (484 out of 664 cases). Stated differently, harm or
the potential for harm is present in most environmental
cases or they would not be violations at all. Our challenge
in examining prosecutorial discretion factors was to identify cases where harm was aggravated and therefore might
be a reason the case was criminally prosecuted. It is in this
narrower understanding of harm that the number of cases
may be limited.

regulatory system; and 76% for repetitive violations. We present results here
and in Part II based on defendants.

Copyright © 2015 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.
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Deceptive or Misleading Conduct

Deceptive or misleading conduct undermines the effectiveness of environmental protection in at least three ways.
First, deceptive conduct, such as the use of bypass lines or
midnight dumping, can allow illegal pollution to go undetected. Second, the environmental laws largely involve an
honor system where companies must seek permits or other
authorization for pollution activities and then must monitor and self-report their compliance. When companies
do not conduct required monitoring or honestly report
their pollution activity, they undermine the self-policing
required under the environmental laws. Third, misleading conduct deprives regulators of accurate information
about overall levels of pollution, which they need to make
informed decisions about what pollution to permit.
I have suggested that lying is the most significant factor
in making a criminal case out of what otherwise might be
a civil or administrative violation. If this premise is true
and a high percentage of criminal cases involve deceptive or misleading conduct, it could address concerns that
law-abiding individuals are being unfairly targeted with
criminal prosecution. I would argue that individuals who
misrepresent facts regarding their compliance with legal
requirements are not acting in good faith. Moreover, all
corporations and individuals are expected to be honest in
their statements and submissions to the government. False
statements, concealment, and obstruction of justice are
therefore criminal under both the environmental laws and
Title 18 of the United States Code.
Over 60% of the defendants included in our study
committed violations involving deceptive or misleading
conduct (63%, or 544 of 864 defendants). This finding is
significant because it suggests that the majority of those
charged as environmental criminals engage in conduct
that is viewed as culpable in other areas of the criminal
law as well. To better understand this factor, we analyzed deceptive or misleading conduct based on whether
it occurred during (1) the commission of the underlying
offense (e.g., by using a bypass line to circumvent pollution
control equipment), (2) reporting or recordkeeping (e.g.,
falsifying documents to conceal pollution control activity),
or (3) a cover-up after the violations occurred (e.g., lying to
investigators and destroying evidence of a crime).
More than 36% of the defendants in our study (313 of
864 defendants) engaged in deceptive or misleading conduct in the commission of their violations. Nearly 39%
of the defendants in our study (336 of 864 defendants)
engaged in deceptive or misleading conduct when submitting required reports of pollution activity or in maintaining required compliance records. More than 24% of the
defendants (209 of 864 defendants) engaged in some type
of after-the-fact effort to conceal violations from regulators.
Perhaps as significantly, nearly one-half of the defendants engaging in deceptive or misleading conduct did
so in multiple ways. Of the 544 defendants who engaged
in deceptive or misleading conduct, 106 defendants were

8-2015

involved solely in deception during the commission of the
offense, 123 defendants were involved in deception solely
during reporting or recordkeeping, and 80 defendants were
engaged in deceptive conduct solely during cover-up activity. The remaining 236 defendants, or 43%, were engaged
in two or more types of deceptive activity.
Deceptive or misleading conduct inculpates both for its
own sake—both law and ethics demand that we be truthful—and because of what it reveals about the mental state
of the majority of criminal defendants in environmental
cases. It has long been argued that the complexity of the
environmental laws lays a trap for the uninformed, and that
reduced mental state requirements compound the problem
by criminalizing conduct that defendants had no idea was
unlawful, let alone criminal. Our study’s findings concerning the prevalence of deceptive or misleading conduct do
not mean that the environmental laws are not complex or
that their criminal provisions are not far reaching. The fact
that so many of the defendants charged as environmental
criminals engaged in deceptive or misleading conduct,
however, may undercut the argument that the government
is prosecuting individuals who make good-faith efforts to
comply and do not engage in any culpable behavior.

C.

Operating Outside the Regulatory System

The third factor that I have argued may warrant criminal
enforcement involves companies that operate outside the
regulatory scheme. Like many modern statutory schemes,
the environmental laws impose substantial regulatory
requirements on facilities across the United States. It is no
longer credible for companies to claim ignorance of the fact
that their conduct may be regulated. Companies that participate in the regulatory system do so at substantial cost
and should not be at a competitive disadvantage when compared to companies that fail to meet their legal obligations.
In addition, as noted earlier, the government depends upon
complete and accurate information about pollution activity
in order to operate an effective permitting system. When
companies fail to participate in the regulatory system, the
government has no mechanism for taking into account
their pollution activity, leading to a lack of information that
could undermine environmental protection efforts.
Whether such behavior warrants criminal enforcement,
of course, is a separate question from whether the government must take enforcement action to promote compliance
efforts. In some instances, criminal enforcement may be
appropriate. If a company transports hazardous waste to
facilities that are not permitted to receive it, for example,
there is a significant potential that the waste will be stored
unsafely or disposed of illegally. Likewise, if a company
stores or disposes of hazardous waste without a permit,
there is a correspondingly significant risk that the public
may be exposed to harmful hazardous waste and that toxic
pollutants will contaminate the environment. Conversely,
civil or administrative enforcement may be more appropriate when the failure to operate within the regulatory system

Copyright © 2015 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.
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Number of Defendants Charged

involves notification or recordkeeping requireFigure 2. Repetitive Violations by Duration
ments, or if there is evidence that a defendant failed
400
to comply with permitting requirements because of
350
a good-faith misunderstanding about whether its
300
activities were regulated.
250
Nearly one-third of the defendants charged
200
with environmental crimes operated outside the
351
regulatory system (33% or 287 out of 864 defen150
220
dants). Of those 287 defendants, 85% failed to
100
184
obtain permits required under the environmental
50
46
56
laws or transported hazardous wastes to facili0
ties that were not permitted to receive hazardous
Not a
2-7 days
8-31 days 32-365 days 366+ days
factor/
waste. Slightly less than 15% of defendants who
1 day
operated outside the regulatory system failed to
maintain required records; 5.6% of those defenDays of Duration
dants failed to monitor for pollution activity, and
committed violations that lasted more than a year (41% or
30% failed to report pollution.
351 defendants who engaged in repetitive violations). The
Significantly, most defendants charged with failure to
results for duration of violations are summarized in Figure
maintain records, failure to monitor, or failure to report
2, above.
also committed another subcategory of violation. Only one
These findings admit to competing interpretations about
defendant over the six-year period covered by the study was
the significance of repetitive violations. On the one hand,
charged solely with recordkeeping violations, and only three
as noted above, more than three-quarters of the defendants
defendants were charged solely with failure to monitor viocommitted violations that lasted more than one day. Of
lations. The numbers were higher for failure to report polthat group, 84% committed violations that lasted more
lution activity, including 18 defendants or approximately
than one month and 52% committed violations that lasted
2% of all defendants charged with environmental crime.
more than one year. Those findings suggest that duration
In contrast, there were 184 defendants charged solely
is often an aggravating factor in environmental criminal
with either failure to obtain a permit or permit violations,
prosecutions—and that most defendants commit violaaccounting for 21% of all defendants.
tions over a period of months or years.
The overwhelming number of defendants charged with
On the other hand, more than a fifth of defendants
permit violations—both alone and in combination with
(21%) committed violations that occurred on a single day.
other acts properly characterized as operating outside the
Indeed, just over one-quarter of all defendants (27%) comregulatory system—suggests that prosecutors have exermitted violations that did not last more than one week.
cised their discretion to focus on the type of actions that
Those findings suggest that, while environmental criminal
most undermine the regulatory system and generally do
cases most often involve violations lasting a month or lonnot prosecute when the violations are more technical.
ger, a significant percentage of cases involve violations of
relatively limited duration.
D. Repetitive Violations
We examined the single-day defendants more closely
to determine whether factors were present that might
The fourth category of cases that I have asserted might be
explain why isolated misconduct resulted in criminal
appropriate for criminal prosecution is repetitive violations.
charges. We determined that 80% of the defendants
We focused on the duration of the charged misconduct
engaged in misconduct that involved at least one of the
and of any other relevant conduct to identify the extent
other aggravating factors, with 50% of the defendants
to which criminal charges were based on repetitive violaengaged in deceptive or misleading conduct. The prestions. We considered two types of repetitive violations to
ence of those aggravating factors might be sufficient to
be potentially aggravating: first, single violations that were
justify criminal prosecution. Moreover, the fact that
egregious enough that they continued for multiple days,
charges are focused on a single day does not mean that
weeks, months, or years; and, second, multiple violations
the misconduct was limited to a single day; prosecutors
that occurred over a period of days, weeks, months, or years.
may have agreed to charge a single day of violation as part
More than three-quarters of the defendants in our dataof a plea agreement. Nonetheless, cases involving isolated
base committed violations that lasted more than a day
misconduct merit caution; an isolated violation should be
(79% or 679 out of 864 defendants). We then sorted to
more egregious to warrant criminal enforcement.3
determine how many of those defendants committed violations that either lasted more than a week, more than a
3.	 There were 36 defendants who did not commit repetitive violations who
month, or more than a year or that had harmful effects
also did not engage in conduct involving any of the other aggravating facover a comparable period of time. We found that the largest
tors. The charges for these defendants fall outside my normative model. I
number of defendants who engaged in repetitive conduct
analyze them in Part II, Section B infra, to determine whether or not they
appear to be marginal cases for criminal prosecution.
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not involve one of the first three factors are unlikely to face
criminal charges.
Second, repetitiveness often is present when criminal charges
are brought but rarely is the sole aggravating factor. Repetitiveness was the most prevalent of the four factors, accountIn this Part, I analyze the data regarding the presence of
ing for 79% of the defendants (679 out of 864 defendants).
aggravating factors in environmental prosecutions from
Repetitiveness was the sole aggravating factor, however,
two perspectives. First, I analyze how often multiple aggrafor only 10% of the defendants who committed repetitive
vating factors were present in the database and whether
violations (67 out of 679 defendants), which is the lowest
there appears to be any relationships among the factors.
for any aggravating factor.4 Stated differently, 90% of the
Second, I examine cases with no aggravating factors to
defendants who committed repetitive violations (612 out
determine whether they reveal marginal cases.
of 679 defendants) also had at least one other aggravating
factor.
These findings suggest that, while prosecutors may
A.
Multiple Aggravating Factors and the
prefer to charge repetitive violations, repetitiveness alone
Relationships Between Aggravating Factors
may not be driving charging decisions.
Third, more than 71% of defendants (612 out of 864
As Part I explained, aggravating factors were present for
defendants) engaged in conduct that involved one of the first
96% of the defendants in our six-year dataset (828 out of
three factors (significant harm, deceptive conduct, operat864 defendants). To better understand the role of these
ing outside the regulatory system) and repetitiveness. Since
aggravating factors, I also analyzed how often multiple facmost environmental crimes involve one of the first three
tors were present and considered the relationship between
aggravating factors (88% of all defendants) and most envifactors. Two or more aggravating factors were present for
ronmental crimes involve repetitive violations (79% of all
74% of the defendants (638 out of 864 defendants). The
defendants), we would expect to see one of the first three
fact that such a high percentage of defendants had multiple
factors present along with repetitiveness in a high percentaggravating factors suggests a higher level of egregiousness
age of cases. But the relationship was even stronger when
than would be present if most defendants had only a sinwe looked at multi-factor defendants. Repetitiveness was
gle aggravating factor. Our data regarding the number of
present for 96% of the defendants with two or more aggraaggravating factors is presented in Figure 3:
vating factors (612 out of 638 defendants). For
defendants with two factors, repetitiveness was
Figure 3. Defendants Charged by
present for 94% of the defendants (443 out of 469
Number of Aggravating Factors
defendants).5 The pairing of repetitiveness with one
864
or more of the other aggravating factors was the
most dominant multi-factor relationship when cal500
culated as a percentage of all defendants (71% of all
400
defendants).6 This finding suggests that prosecutors
often reserve criminal prosecution for violations
300
469
that involve both one of the first three factors and
200
repetitiveness and are less likely to bring criminal
charges if that relationship is absent.
190
100
149
36
We found evidence of other relationships among
20
0
the aggravating factors. Deceptive or misleading
No factor
1 factor
2 factors
3 factors
4 factors
conduct occurred least frequently in combination
with the factors of significant harm and operatNumber of Aggravating Factors
ing outside the regulatory system. We found 545
defendants who engaged in deceptive or misleadAn analysis of these data supports three additional
ing conduct; only 11% of those defendants (58 defendants)
findings regarding the aggravating factors in environmenengaged in conduct that resulted in significant harm. In
tal crimes.
First, one of the first three factors (all factors other than
repetitiveness) was present for 88% of the defendants (761
4.	 Operating outside the regulatory system also is the sole aggravating factor
in only 11% of the cases where it is present (30 out of 281 defendants). In
out of 864 defendants). In other words, most defendants
contrast, deceptive or misleading conduct is the sole aggravating factor for
were charged for violations that involved harm, deceptive
36% of the defendants who engaged in deceptive or misleading conduct
or misleading conduct, or operating outside the regula(136 out of 547 defendants).
5.	 Of course, most defendants in our dataset committed repetitive violations,
tory scheme. These findings may suggest a further refineso I would expect to see a significant overlap between repetitive violations
ment of my overall conclusions from Part I: (1) in most
and other factors. Still, it is revealing that the other three factors were presinstances, prosecutors have reserved criminal prosecution
ent so often and that repetitiveness appeared by itself so infrequently.
6.	 The combination of one of the first three factors and repetitiveness also is
for defendants with one of the first three aggravating facthe most dominant relationship as a percentage of all cases, accounting for
tors; and (2) defendants who engage in conduct that does
68% of all cases in the dataset (450 out of 664 cases).
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other words, significant harm was present as a percentage
of defendants involved in deceptive or misleading conduct less frequently than in our dataset as a whole (17%
of all defendants). More of the defendants who engaged in
deceptive or misleading conduct were operating outside the
regulatory system (21% or 117 defendants) but a relatively
modest amount overall and, as with harm, less often than
in our dataset as a whole (where it was present for 33% of
all defendants).
Deceptive or misleading conduct was present as the
sole aggravating factor more often than it was paired with
significant harm. Deceptive or misleading conduct was
the sole aggravating factor for 14% of the defendants who
engaged in deceptive or misleading conduct (78 out of
545 defendants). For defendants who had only one aggravating factor, deceptive or misleading conduct appeared
more often than any other aggravating factor both in raw
numbers (the next largest category was repetitive violations, which was the sole aggravating factor for 67 defendants) and as a percentage of defendants possessing that
factor (the next largest category was significant harm at
11% of all significant harm defendants). As with other
aggravating factors, most defendants who engaged in
deceptive or misleading conduct also committed repetitive violations (83% or 452 out of 545 defendants), which
suggests that deceptive or misleading conduct is charged
most often when it occurs more than once. It merits
emphasis, though, that deceptive and misleading conduct was charged most often as a standalone factor—and
appeared the most often of the first three aggravating factors. As noted previously, in my experience, deceptive or
misleading conduct is the most significant factor in the
exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
Conversely, we found that there appeared to be at least
some positive relationship between significant harm and
operating outside the regulatory system. The correlation
was not particularly strong: we saw both significant harm
and operating outside the regulatory system for 60 defendants (41% of significant harm defendants and 21% of
defendants operating outside the regulatory system). Yet
both were present slightly more often together than they
were present in the dataset as a whole (operating outside the
regulatory system was present for 33% of all defendants;
significant harm was present for 17% of all defendants).
In addition, even a modest correlation between significant
harm and operating outside the regulatory system may be
noteworthy, since the regulatory system seeks to protect
public health and the environment from harm (and the
risk of harm).

B.

Defendants With No Aggravating Factors Present

For 36 of the defendants in our database, we determined
that none of the four aggravating factors was present. We
examined each case individually to determine whether,
based on the conduct described in the court documents, any
involved questionable exercise of prosecutorial discretion.

45 ELR 10807

For the 36 defendants with no aggravating factors, 17
defendants committed violations that, while insufficient to
code as “operating outside the regulatory system,” nonetheless involved core subcategory violations such as failing to
obtain a permit. For example, in nearly all of the RCRA
cases in the database, the defendant engaged in conduct
that at least involved failing to acquire the requisite permit,
which is a subset of culpability under operating outside the
regulatory system. But not all of those defendants were
coded as operating outside the regulatory system because
they might have been partially operating within the regulatory system.
Perhaps there might be circumstances where the failure
to obtain a permit reflected good-faith misunderstanding
of the permitting requirement or, in the RCRA context,
the definition of hazardous waste. In those circumstances,
prosecutors might choose to exercise their discretion to
decline prosecution in favor of civil or administrative
enforcement. By itself, however, there is nothing about
prosecution for failure to obtain regulatory permits that
signals prosecutorial overreaching. The obligation to
acquire and maintain valid permits for pollution activity
or to store and dispose of hazardous waste is not an arcane
or obscure regulatory requirement.
Only 19 defendants engaged in conduct that was not
captured by any category or subcategory. We analyzed
each of these cases and found that researchers had noted
explanatory “additional aggravating factors” that may have
influenced prosecutors for six defendants. For example, one
prosecution involved safety violations occurring in schools,
which may have prompted the prosecutor to pursue criminal charges. Another prosecution involved conduct that
appeared to blatantly disregard the law but was not captured by one of the aggravating factors.
As a result, most prosecutions with no aggravating factors involved either a subcategory of operating outside
the regulatory system or an additional aggravating factor.
Only 13 defendants engaged in conduct where prosecution could not be justified by a subcategory or additional
aggravating factor. Of that number, nine defendants were
charged in an indictment or information that merely
recited the elements of the offense. It is far easier to identify aggravating factors in so-called speaking indictments,
where prosecutors provided additional details about the
misconduct, including the type of evidence that fit within
the aggravating factor analysis.
Under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, however, only the elements of the offense must be included in
an indictment, and pleading practices vary from district to
district. In the absence of speaking indictments, we looked
to other documents to determine whether aggravating factors were present (e.g., plea agreements, factual basis statements, sentencing memoranda, and judgments) but those
documents sometimes did not exist or did not provide
additional information beyond the charges. Perhaps some
of the nine defendants who were charged in “bare-bones”
indictments or informations did not engage in conduct
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that involved any aggravating factors. If so, those could
be marginal criminal cases; we cannot tell from the court
documents. Other than those nine defendants, however,
there are only four defendants for whom we could not discern a rationale for the prosecution despite the availability
of court documents that provided details about their misconduct. Those four defendants were charged with negligence on a single day, which may involve conduct where
civil charges may have been more appropriate. Nonetheless, four defendants is an extremely small percentage of
the 864 defendants in our database.

III. Conclusion
More than three decades after EPA hired its first criminal investigators, the prosecution of environmental crime
remains the source of persistent claims about over-criminalization and lingering questions about the role of criminal enforcement under the environmental laws. Given the
broad discretion that prosecutors have under the environmental laws—and the erosion of bipartisan support for
environmental protection—those expressions of concern
are not surprising. But they point to the need for a stronger
normative framework and a better empirical understanding of criminal enforcement.
I have argued that criminal prosecution would be most
appropriate when one or more aggravating factors were present: significant environmental harm or public health effects,
deceptive or misleading conduct, operating outside the
regulatory system, and repetitive violations. My empirical
research now strongly suggests that criminal enforcement
has been limited in most instances to violations involving
one or more of those aggravating factors. In 96% of the
environmental prosecutions from 2005–2010, at least one
aggravating factor was present. In more than 88% of those
environmental prosecutions, the defendants caused significant harm, engaged in deceptive or misleading conduct,
or operated outside the regulatory system that protects the
environment and public health. In nearly three-quarters of
the cases, two or more aggravating factors were present, with
repetitiveness most often the additional aggravating factor.
These findings suggest that prosecutors have reserved criminal enforcement for egregious misconduct.
Moreover, the extent to which environmental criminals engage in deceptive and misleading conduct—more
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than 63% of those prosecuted from 2005–2010—may
undermine claims that environmental defendants are
well-intentioned individuals inadvertently snared by complex regulations and a criminal enforcement scheme with
reduced mental state requirements. The environmental
regulatory system depends upon honest self-reporting;
those who lie to conceal violations are engaging in culpable
behavior that cripples efforts to protect the environment
and the public from the risks associated with unlawful pollution. These findings take on added significance because
one-third of the defendants in our study were operating
entirely outside the regulatory scheme, making no effort to
comply with the law. Criminal enforcement is appropriate
for defendants who deceive or seek to operate outside the
law, particularly when their conduct risks or causes significant harm to the environment and public health.
There were some cautionary notes revealed by our study:
4% of the defendants engaged in conduct that involved no
aggravating factors, and a small number of those defendants
were charged in what appear to be pure negligence cases.
Cases without aggravating factors and those involving pure
negligence should receive extra scrutiny from prosecutors
to ensure that criminal prosecution is appropriate. In addition, approximately one-fifth of all defendants engaged in
conduct that occurred on a single day. Of course, a violation on a single day could be egregious enough to warrant
criminal prosecution; in most single-day matters, an aggravating factor other than repetitiveness was present. Nonetheless, the most compelling prosecutions typically involve
repeated misconduct, which compounds the wrongdoing
and limits any doubt about the defendant’s intent.
Overall, however, my research should reduce uncertainty about which environmental violations may result
in criminal prosecution and quiet concerns about overcriminalization. Prosecutors appear to be focusing on
conduct that involves the aggravating factors that I have
identified; when those factors are absent, criminal prosecution is unlikely to occur. Prosecutors thus have reserved
criminal prosecution for culpable conduct and avoided
charges based on technical violations or when defendants
acted in good faith. Perhaps most importantly, my research
provides empirical evidence that prosecutors have properly
exercised their broad discretion under the environmental
laws and assured an appropriate role for criminal enforcement in our environmental protection system.
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